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I propose a model in which a stock exchange can improve its liquidity by tightening its listing 
requirements.  Because  these  reduce  information  asymmetry,  they  increase  the  utility  of 
investors and lead to a high investor participation on the exchange. However, the exchange 
never sets the highest possible level of listing requirements because investors also incur a risk 
due to more transparency. Their utility is concave in the level of listing requirements. This 
property determines the optimal decisions of an exchange as well as the social optimum. The 
level of listing requirements maximizing investor welfare depends on the sensitivity of the 
utility of investors to  changes  in liquidity and varies with the organization of listing and 
trading.  A  monopolist  exchange  always  under-regulates  if  regulation  is  costly.  Under-
regulation is exacerbated if other trading venues free ride on the regulation and if the trading 
fee is determined by the level of listing requirements. While investors are better off if trading 
is separated from listing and is a competitive industry, an exchange has a higher profit when it 
is a monopolist in listing and trading. 
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Liquidity Effects of Listing Requirements 
 
1.  Introduction 
Recent changes in the industrial organization of stock exchanges have given rise to a 
debate in the academic and professional literature about how exchanges should be regulated.
2 
Exchanges are increasingly turned into listed  and  profit  maximizing  entities. They  also 
compete with other trading venues for  volume on the secondary market, which  decouples 
listings from trading. If exchanges regulate listings, competing trading platforms can free ride 
on  this  regulatory  activity  while  offering  more  advantageous  trading  conditions.  These 
developments in the stock market industry have given rise to  a debate upon  whether stock 
markets should continue to regulate listings or whether they should focus on offering a cheap 
and liquid trading venue while other institutions deal with listings.  
  This  paper  explores  how  a  separation  of  listing  and  trading  affects  the opti mal 
decisions upon trading fees and listing requirements by profit maximizing exchanges, and the 
impact of such a separation on investor welfare.  It shows that listing requirements have an 
impact on liquidity through less information asymmetry and enhanced investor participation. 
These liquidity effects are shown to determine the decisions of exchanges in equilibrium, and 
the welfare effects of different trading and listing organizations.   The specific questions 
addressed in this paper are: what determines the profit and thus the equilibrium decisions of 
exchanges, what determines the socially optimal level of listing requirements, what drives 
possible under-regulation? 
  Investors benefit from a higher level of listing requirements through a better liquidity 
on the market. However, what listing requirements maximize their welfare depends on the 
sensitivity of their utility to changes in liquidity. This sensitivity is determined by the risk 
premium but also by the trading fee. The higher the trading fee is, the  less investors benefit 
from higher listing requirements and the smaller is the socially optimal level of listing 
requirements. Trading fees are influenced by the industrial organization of trading and listing 
which affects therefore also the regulation maximizing investor welfare. Investors are best-off 
and require a high level of listing requirements when the trading fee is the lowest. 
  As long as an exchange bears regulatory costs, it under -regulates regardless of how 
listing and trading are organized. The extent of under-regulation depends on the sensitivity of 
the exchange’s income to changes in the liquidity. Under-regulation is exacerbated by two 
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factors. First, if the volume goes on another trading venue which free rides on the regulatory 
activity of the exchange, the latter has a smaller income and sets a smaller listing requirement. 
Second, if trading is organized by a monopoly, the trading fee increases with the level of 
listing requirements. This reduces the impact of improved liquidity on the exchange’s profit 
and induces the exchange to set a low listing requirement. Both effects can be avoided by 
introducing competition in trading in which case, the liquidity effects of listing requirements 
have the highest impact on investor welfare.  
The main elements of the model are as follows. Investors can enter a stock exchange 
and participate in the IPO of a firm. They do so if their expected utility exceeds opportunity 
costs which differ across them. Those investors that have entered the exchange can be hit by a 
liquidity shock in which case they must sell their holding. They can have the possibility to 
switch to a trading platform which offers a smaller trading fee. The listed firm must disclose 
information about its productivity. The precision of this information depends on the level of 
listing requirements. The shareholders of the firm only observe the information released by 
the firm. However, there are informed investors on the secondary market knowing perfectly 
the productivity of the firm. Their existence gives rise to a spread. The exchange sets its 
trading fee as well as its listing requirements to maximize its expected profit. A benchmark 
case is developed in which the monopolist exchange lists the firm and organizes trading in the 
shares. The results are compared to cases in which listing is separated from trading. 
The spread is determined by the probability of informed trading on the secondary 
market. Therefore it decreases not only the smaller information asymmetry is, but also the 
more uninformed investors enter the exchange. A smaller information asymmetry increases 
the  expected  utility  from  participating  in  the  IPO  which  attracts  investors  with  high 
opportunity costs on the exchange, reducing further the spread. Two equilibria are possible: If 
the exchange sets a high level of listing requirements, investor participation is high leading to 
a  high  market  capitalization,  a  high  volume  and  a  good  liquidity.  If  the  level  of  listing 
requirements  is  low,  market  participation  is  small  leading  to  a  small  volume  and  a  bad 
liquidity. 
Multiple equilibria due to investor participation externalities have been extensively 
analyzed in Dow (2004) and Pagano (1989) in a slightly different context. In these models, 
uninformed  investors  trade  on  the  stock  market  to  hedge  endowment  shocks.  The  more 
investors participate on the stock exchange, the better is liquidity, either because informed 
trading  is  reduced  (Dow  2004)  or  because  prices  become  less  sensitive  to  individual 
endowment  shocks  (Pagano  1989).  While  their  models  focus  on  the  entry  decision  of   4 
investors and ignore the organization of the exchange, this paper pushes the analysis further 
since it integrates insights of Dow (2004) into a context of exchange competition. The present 
paper also contributes to this literature because it not only states the possibility of several 
equilibria,  but  endogenises  their  occurrence.  It  shows  also  that  the  existence  of  several 
equilibria  may  incite  the  exchange  to  implement  an  equilibrium  with  a  small  investor 
participation and a too low level of listing requirements compared to the one maximizing 
investor welfare, even if regulatory costs are small. 
Investors’ utility does not increase monotonically in the level of listing requirements 
on the exchange. Investors may need to trade on the secondary market after information is 
revealed and incur therefore a risk related to the precision of information. The more precise 
information is the higher is the uncertainty about the future price on the secondary market. If 
this “signal risk” (Alles and Lundholm 1993) is important, it may offset the benefit of smaller 
trading costs if the precision is high. Thus utility of investors is concave in the precision of 
information and can decrease for high levels of precision. This limits the socially optimal 
level of listing requirements which decreases, the smaller the gains from a better liquidity are 
compared to the signal risk. This property of the utility function is studied in Diamond (1985) 
who  shows  that  as  long  as  more  precise  information  reduces  the  number  of  investors 
searching  for  costly  information,  a  high  precision  increases  investor  welfare  by  reducing 
information costs and making beliefs more homogenous.  In the model  analyzed here, the 
concave utility is obtained with identical preferences and homogeneous beliefs. It stems from 
the trade-off investors face between a better liquidity and a high signal risk. 
The concave utility also influences the optimal level of listing requirements set by the 
exchange. The higher the information precision is, the smaller is the increase in the exchanges 
income. This is because the volume as well as the market capitalization are determined by 
investors preferences. This prevents the exchange from setting a high enough level of listing 
requirements to maximize investor welfare. This result complements findings in Chemmanur 
and  Fulghieri  (2006)  and  Huddart  et  al.  (1999)  who  show  that  a  monopolistic  exchange 
optimally sets the highest possible level of listing requirements. In Huddart et al. in particular, 
the listing requirements aim precisely at reducing informed trading as in the model analyzed 
here. However, in their model investors benefit always from a more precise information and 
the signal risk stemming from the fact that investors determine their optimal portfolio before 
information is released but expect to trade after information is released, does not exist. This 
risk, however, is  shown to  influence investor’s preferences  and  behavior and thereby the 
trading conditions, in particular the liquidity, in equilibrium.   5 
  If the exchange is a monopolist, its income stems from a listing fee corresponding to 
the market capitalization of the listed firms and from the trading volume.  The optimal trading 
fee  increases  the  smaller  the  listing  requirement  is  but  total  trading  costs  diminish.  The 
exchange implements the equilibrium in which all investors enter if its income is sensitive 
enough  to  changes  in  the  liquidity.  Otherwise,  the  exchange  sets  a  low  level  of  listing 
requirement and excludes high cost investors. The exchange under-regulates always, but this 
is only due to the existence of regulatory costs. Also, the existence of a trading fee lowers the 
sensitivity of the income to changes in the liquidity which increases the under-regulation 
problem. 
If listing is separate from trading and if trading is organized by another monopolist, 
the trading platform can free ride on the listing requirements set by the exchange and offer a 
good liquidity. This, however, induces the trading platform to set a high trading fee. The 
trading fee lowers the market capitalization of the listed firms and thereby the profit of the 
exchange. The trading platform does not internalize the loss of the regulating exchange due to 
the trading fee which is therefore higher than in the case of a single monopolist exchange. The 
exchange  sets  a  low  level  of  listing  requirements  not  only  because  it  loses  income  from 
trading but also because of the higher trading fee. In this case, investors are worse-off and the 
under-regulation problem is more severe than in the benchmark case. 
The free riding problem is not the source of under-regulation but enforces it. As long 
as the trading fee depends on the level of listing requirements, it always lowers the effect of a 
better liquidity on investor welfare and increases under-regulation. If listing is separated from 
trading  and  the  trading  industry  is  competitive,  there  is  no  free  riding  problem  and  no 
interdependence between the trading fee and the listing requirements. In this case, investor 
welfare is the highest. However, the profit of the exchange is smaller than in the benchmark 
case. The higher income from listings does not compensate the loss of income from trading. 
There is a divergence in interests since investors prefer separation with a competitive trading 
industry whereas the exchange prefers to be a monopolist in listing and trading. 
Listing  requirements  are  shown  to  improve  liquidity  by  diminishing  information 
asymmetry,  as  well  as  by  entailing  more  participation  of  investors.  Both  of  these  results 
grounding the analysis of the model find support in the empirical literature. Frost et al. (2002) 
show that the strength of disclosure systems is positively associated with market liquidity in a 
sample of 50 stock exchanges in the world. Ramadorai and Jenkinson (2007), suggest that 
there  are  different  clienteles  among  investors  with  respect  to  listing  requirements.  While 
investors  may  prefer  a  highly  regulated  exchange  for  confidence  reasons  (a  smaller   6 
probability to be cheated by the firms, a higher average quality and a smaller maximum risk 
of listed firms)
3, the analysis here links investors participation to a smaller risk of  adverse 
selection on the secondary market . It takes the perspective of Huddart et al. (1999),  who 
conclude  that  a  profi t  maximizing  monopolist  exchange  sets  a  high  level  of  listing 
requirements to attract the order flow of liquidity traders, but broadens the analysis by 
introducing competition for volume by another trading venue  in the shares listed on the 
exchange
4  as well as  heterogeneity among investors. These enlargements allow a more 
realistic approach concerning listing regulation and show that the optimal result in Huddart et 
al.  (1999)  is  only  one  among  several  possible  equilibria  and  tightly  linked  to  market 
conditions not taken into account in their model. 
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3  analyses 
the  entry  decision  of  investors.  Section  4  presents  the  optimal  trading  fee  and  listing 
requirement set by a monopolist exchan ge. Section 5  discusses  separation of listing and 
trading and section 7 concludes. Proofs are given in the appendix. 
 
2.  Model 
Firm. Consider a firm with a risk neutral manager and without assets in place. The 
firm can realize a project if it raises capital by listing on an exchange and issuing K shares. If 
the firm does not list, it cannot realize the project and its value is zero.
5 The project yields a 
payoff of  x V  1  per share. The productivity, x, is a random variable distributed over four 
equally likely states of the nature. In the two best states, the average productivity is  h x  and 
the final productivity can take the values    h x  or    h x with probability ½. In the two 
other states, the average productivity is  l x  , with  0   l h x x , and the final productivity can 
take the values    l x  and    l x  with probability ½. Average productivities represent the 
quality of the firm. A good firm has a high mean productivity. The parameter   represents 
the risk of the firm related to its economic activity. The difference in average productivities is 
assumed to be high relative to the economic risk:   2   l h x x .  
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At the time of listing, the average productivity is unknown to all agents. Therefore, the 
listing decision alone does not convey information to the market about the quality of the 
firm.
6 The expected market value of the firm if it lists is positive and since the reservation 
value is zero, the firm always lists. 
The manager learns its type after  listing.  However, he  cannot or is not willing to  
credibly convey this information to market participants. It remains his private information. 
Even though, in reality, firms voluntarily disclose information, and in particular large firms 
are followed by analysts and the media, there is information asymmetry even about large 
international firms. This model relies on the existence of information asymmetry , and needs 
therefore this hypothesis. If the manager could disclose credibly its type, a good manager 
would always do so. Since the market expects the good manager to disclose, it infers that a 
firm which does not disclose is   bad and information asymmetry vanishes.  Besides this 
theoretical argument, two “practical” reasons justify this assumption. First, this paper ignores 
completely competition on the product market. Literature in accounting
7 shows that firms may 
suffer “proprietary costs” by disclosing information to competitors. These may adjust their 
strategies and compete more aggressively on the product market, which can lead to a lower 
profit of the firm considered if it discloses information about its type. Second, for medium 
size firms and firms with weak media or analysts’ coverage it may be difficult and costly to 
bring the information to all market participants without an institutionalized procedure. 
Exchange. There is an exchange listing the firm and organizing trading in the shares. 
It is a monopolist in listing as well as in trading. The exchange charges a trading fee, c, per 
share traded on the secondary market and a listing fee, F, paid by the firm.  The listing fee is a 
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fixed price corresponding to the market value of the firm. If the listing fee varied with the 
amount of issued shares or with the market value of the firm, the number of issued shares and 
the market value would always be smaller than in the case of a fixed fee. Therefore, a variable 
listing fee is not optimal for the exchange. 
The exchange also sets listing requirements. Listing requirements are a set of rules to 
which  the  listed  firm  must  commit.  These  rules  may  contain  accounting  and  reporting 
standards  but  also  corporate  governance  devices  which,  if  they  are  in  place,  may  reveal 
information about the quality of the firm.  Listing requirements lead to public information 
about the quality of the firm once the latter has been revealed to the manager. They constitute 
a noisy public signal, s, observed by all market participants. Since the type of the firm is 
unknown when the firm lists and both possible qualities occur with the same probability, the 
signal is expected to take either value,  h x  or  l x , with probability ½ when the firm lists. 
With probability    1 , 5 . 0  p  the observed signal corresponds to the true type of the 
firm; it corresponds to the wrong type otherwise. The precision of the signal, p, represents the 
strictness of the listing requirements: the tougher they are, the higher is the probability that the 
observed signal corresponds to the true type of the firm. The exchange bears regulatory costs 
related to the enforcement of the listing requirements:  ) (p C  with  0 ' C  and  0 ' '  C . The firm 
does not bear compliance costs. 
The  set  up  of  this  game  is  close  to  Staughton  et  al  (2001)  but  differs  along  two 
dimensions. First the timing of information revelation is different since in Staughton et al. the 
manager  knows  its  type  (which  is  also  the  average  payoff)  before  he  lists  the  firm  (see 
footnote 8). Second the information content is not the same. In Staughton et al. the signal is 
noisy information about the final payoff of the security, while in the present model the signal 
reveals information about the average payoff of the security. Both types of information lead to 
less adverse selection on the exchange, but their impact on the risk perceived by investors is 
different. While a signal on the final payoff  reduces the potential variability of this payoff 
once information has been revealed, information about the average quality of the firm reduces 
only the uncertainty on the distribution mean of the payoff but not the ex post perceived risk 
of the economic activity of the firm. This distinction allows separating the effects of the risk 
of the economic activity and the effects of the uncertainty about the firms’ quality, on the 
decisions of the exchange.  The assumption about the information content of the signal seems 
also consistent with reality since information reported by or about firms concerns items like 
production  procedures,  economic  achievements,  planned  investments  or,  through  the   9 
application of corporate governance devices, the likelihood of private benefit extraction or 
non optimal investment strategies in the perspective of investors (empire building…). This 
information allows assessing the quality on average of firms.  
The  exchange  sets  the  trading  fee,  c,  the  listing  fee,  F,  and  the  level  of  listing 
requirements, p, to maximize its expected profit,  . As exchanges are increasingly turned 
into demutualised and listed entities, this objective seems the must accurate in the curren t 
context.
8 
Investors.  There  are  two  types  of  investors  on  the  exchange:  informed  and 
uninformed. The number of informed investors is I N . They know perfectly the quality of the 
firm and trade only on the secondary market in the case the listed firm is bad. Uninformed 
investors observe the signal, s. They are the only investors participating in the IPO. When 
uninformed investors enter the stock market, they bear opportunity costs:  l N  among them 
have  low  opportunity  costs  ( l Oc )  and h N   have  high  opportunity  costs  ( h Oc ), 
with 0   l h Oc Oc .
9 Opportunity costs  may represent alternative investment opportunities. 
They may also represent entry costs borne by  investors such as costs related to information 
gathering and understanding. Christiansen et al. (2005), for example, find that economists are 
more likely to participate in the stock market than persons with any other education.  
If uninformed investors have entered the stock market and bought shares of the firm, 
they may be hit by a liq uidity shock: with probability    1 , 0  t  they must sell their entire 
holding on the secondary market. This constitutes the trading volume of the exchange. In the 
case of a liquidity shock, investors sell their holding to a risk neutral market maker. Informed 
traders may mimic uninformed ones if they know that the firm is bad. The market maker has 
the same information as uninformed investors. The price, at which he is willing to buy the 
shares, P, takes into account the possibility that the order comes from an informed investor. 
Thus the market maker sets a spread, S, due to information asymmetry. 
Uninformed investors are risk averse. They have an initial wealth, 0 W , and determine 
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Investors enter the stock market if their expected utility is higher than their opportunity cost. 
Denote the number of uninformed investors entering the stock market by  u N . The fraction of 
informed investors among all investors on the market is    I u I N N N n   . 
Timing. The game is organized in five periods. In the two first periods, the exchange 
determines  its  organization:  first  it  sets  a  level  of  listing  requirements  (this  decision  is 
considered as a long term decision since it implies to set up particular listing procedures as 
well as specialized departments to enforce these requirements), second the exchange sets a 
trading fee. The listing fee is the market capitalization of the firms and thus not determined 
separately by the exchange. However, it is implicitly taken into account in the determination 
of p and c. In the third period, investors decide whether to enter the stock market, and if they 
do, they buy the shares issued by the firm. The firm determines how many shares to issue. In 
the fourth period, the manager of the firm learns its type and the signal, s, is revealed to the 
market due to compliance with listing requirements. In the fifth period, some uninformed 
investors are hit by a liquidity shock and sell their holing to a market maker. Finally, in the 
last period payoffs are realized. The model is solved backwards, beginning with the bid price 
set by the market maker in period 5 and ending with the determination of the level of listing 
requirements in period one. Figure 2 displays the different stages of the model. 
 
3.  Investors’ entry decision 
Trading. The following trading model draws upon Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and is 
a generalization of Dow (2004) to a situation with a public signal. Only one side of the market 
is modeled to determine the bid price: the transaction between the selling investors and the 
market  maker.  The  spread  is  inferred  from  the  difference  between  the  bid  price  and  the 
conditional  expected  value  of  the  asset.  As  in  Dow  (2004),  it  corresponds  to  twice  this 
difference. 
When the market maker receives a sell order, he determines the bid price, P, according 
to the signal, s, its precision, p, as well as the different types of investors on the market. 
Depending on the observed signal, the probability that the order stems from an uninformed 
investor differs. 
If the market maker has observed  h x s   , with probability p the signal corresponds to 
the true type of the firm and the order comes from an uninformed investor since an informed 
one does not sell the shares of a good firm. With probability (1-p) the signal is wrong and the 
probability that the order comes from an uninformed investor is  t n) 1 (  . Otherwise, the order   11 
stems from an informed investor. The market maker sets the bid price per share conditional on 
the good signal, 
h x s P , such as to break even: 
 
     
l l h x x h x x x s V x s V E t n p p V P           ) 1 )( 1 (       (1) 
 
with    ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( l h h x p x p x s V E       , the expected value of the asset conditional on the 
signal  h x s   and  l x x x V
l    1  the value of the asset of a bad firm. The corresponding spread 
is: 
 
    x p t n p P x s V E S
h h x s h x s           ) ) 1 ( 1 )( 1 ( 2 2       (2) 
 
with  ) ) 1 ( 1 )( 1 ( t n p     the probability of an informed trade and  x p  the difference in value 
between the conditional expectation and the low quality firm. 
If the market maker has observed  l x s  , with probability (1-p) the signal is wrong and 
the order comes from an uninformed investor. With probability p, the signal is correct and the 
order comes from an uninformed investor with probability  t n) 1 (   and from an informed 
investor otherwise. The bid price set by the market maker given the bad signal, 
l x s P , is: 
 
  
l l l x x l x x x s V x s V E t n p p V P           ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (       (3) 
 
with  ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( h l l x p x p x s V E       , the expected value of the asset conditional  on 
the signal  l x s  . The corresponding spread is: 
 
    x p t n p P x s V E S
l l x s l x s           ) 1 )( ) 1 ( 1 ( 2 2       (4) 
 
with  ) ) 1 ( 1 ( t n p    the probability of an informed trade and  x p   ) 1 (  the difference in value 
between the conditional expectation and the low quality firm. 
  Although the probability of informed trading is smaller in the case of a good signal, 
the market maker reduces the bid price by a higher amount which increases the spread. On the 
contrary, if the signal  is  bad, the amount by which the price is  reduced compared to  the   12 
expectation  is  smaller  which  reduces  the  spread  despite  a  higher  probability  of  informed 
trading. These two effects offset each other. The spread is the same regardless of whether the 
signal is good or bad: 
l h x s x s S S    .  
Investors  determine  their  holding  in  the  third  period,  before  the  signal  is  released.  
Because of the possibility of informed trading, uninformed investors expect the market maker 
to set a spread and to sell their order at a discount relative to the unconditional expected 
payoff. However, only the bid price is a random variable for investors. The spread is twice the 
distance between the unconditional expected value of the asset,    ) 2 ( 5 . 0 h l x x V E    , and 
the expected bid price,    P E : 
 
      l h x x t n p p P E V E S        ) ) 1 ( 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 ) ( 2        (5) 
 
In  the  third  period,  the  bid  price  is  a  random  variable  since  it  depends  on  the 
realization of the signal and the resulting probability of informed trading. Thus, investors 
incur a risk when buying the security which is related to how the future realization of the 
signal impacts the bid price. Information revelation shifts wealth of investors either upwards 
or downwards (relative to prior expectation). This risk is labeled “signal risk” in Alles and 
Lundholm (1993)
10 and is determined here by the variance of P: 
 
 
2 2 ) 2 1 (
4
1
) ( l h x x p P Var                (6) 
 
The more precise this signal is, the smaller is the spread but the closer is the revised 
expectation to the true the two possible values,  h x  and l x , which creates more volatility in the 
price. If investors sell after a good signal, they experience a utility gain. If however they sell 
after a bad signal, they suffer a utility loss. The variability of the bid price increases the more 
precise the signal is. It is also amplified by the difference in average productivities since the 
randomness of the bid price stems from the uncertainty about average quality and not from the 
firms’ economic risk ( ). The signal risk is only induced by the early partial resolution of 
uncertainty.  Ceteris  paribus,  investors  would  prefer  the  firm  not  to  commit  to  disclose 
information. In the case of a completely uninformative signal (p=0.5), the trading price and 
the  spread  are  only  affected  by  the  proportion  of  informed  investors  among  all  market 
                                                 
10It is also called “distributive risk” by Hirshleiffer (1971).   13 
participants,  which  is  known.  In  this  case,  there  is  no  uncertainty  on  the  bid  price 
( 0 ) (  P Var ),  but  the  spread  is  the  highest  possible  (for  a  given  number  of  investors), 
  l h x x t n S     ) ) 1 ( 1 ( 5 . 0  . 
 
IPO.  Investors  participating  in  the  IPO  determine  their  demand  of  the  asset  by 
maximizing the expected utility of their final wealth. Since the price on the secondary market 
is random, investors face six states of the world at this stage. If they keep their holding until 
the end of the game (which occurs with probability (1-t)), their final wealth is determined by 
the four states described in figure 1. If investors must sell their holding before the end of the 
game (which occurs with probability t), they face two additional sates of the nature since the 
bid price can be either high or low, depending on the signal. 
The final wealth differs depending on whether investors are hit by a liquidity shock. In 
the case, they keep their holding until the end of the game, investors receive the final payoff 
and their final wealth is:  0
* ) (
~
W P V D W IPO    . If investors have to sell their holding in the 




W P c P D W IPO     . When investors determine their portfolio holding, they take the 
expectation over the period of holding and over the values of the asset:  
 
      ) 2 (
~ *
0 IPO P c S t V E D W W E                (7) 
 
Ceteris paribus, the expected wealth increases the more precise information is because 
it depends only on the spread which diminishes with p. The effect of the precision of the 
signal on the variance of the final wealth is ambiguous. The precision increases the volatility 
of the price but decreases the spread, reducing thereby the wealth loss due to trading. The 
signal has no impact on the economic risk of the firm. 
 
Lemma 1 
Investors face three types of risks: 
(i)  a “fundamental risk” due to the variability of the expected payoff:  ) ( ) 1 ( V Var t   
(ii)  a “signal risk” due to the uncertainty on the bid price: ) (P tVar  
(iii)  a “horizon risk” due to the uncertainty about how long investors can keep their 
holding:  t t c
S E
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Investors incur a fundamental risk if they keep the asset until the payoff is realized. 
This risk is not only determined by the risk of the economic activity (
2  ), but also by the 
uncertainty about the quality of the firm. Since the investment decision is taken before the 
realization  of  the  signal,  this  risk  is  not  affected  by  its precision.  However,  after  public 
information is revealed, this risk diminishes since uncertainty on the firm’s quality is smaller. 
However, the price shifts together with beliefs, which are homogenous, so that there is no 
trading once the signal is observed and investors keep their initial holding if they are not hit 
by a liquidity shock. 
In addition to the fundamental and the signal risk, investors also incur a risk related to 
the uncertainty about how long they can keep the asset since expected payoffs differ in all six 
states of the nature (horizon risk). Investors cannot insure against the liquidity shock. Their 
horizon risk is not diversifiable. The signal risk and the horizon risk are affected in opposite 
ways  by  the  precision  of  information.  The  horizon  risk  is  determined  by  the  difference 
between  the  expected  payoff  of  the  security  and  the  expected  bid  price.  This  difference 
corresponds to the trading costs which diminish the higher the precision is, ceteris paribus, 
since the spread becomes smaller. Thus, while the signal risk always increases with p, the 
horizon risk always decreases with p. The realization of an informative signal can increase as 
well as decrease investors’ utility depending on which of the two risks takes the overhand. 
Investors determine the price they are willing to pay per share by maximizing the 
utility of their final wealth. They discount the share price,  IPO P ,  with respect to the three 
types  of  risks  they  face  and  the  expected  trading  costs  (the  spread  and the  trading  fee): 
     
K
N
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2 . This represents a cost for the firm 
which  adjusts  the  amount  of  issued  shares.  The  firm  issues  the  number  of  shares,  K, 
maximizing  its  expected  market  value:  K P Max IPO K . In equilibrium, the number of  issued 
shares is: 
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Whether  the  number  of  issued  shares  increases  with  the  precision  of  information 
depends on the effect of the latter on the investors’ risk. However, the firm always benefits 
from a more horizon market since liquidity reduces the trading costs and thereby also the 
liquidity risk of investors. The more uninformed investors participate in the exchange, the less   15 
the firms’ decision is affected by the risk of investors’ final wealth since the latter can be 
spread over a higher number of investors. In this case, the amount of issued shares becomes 
more  sensitive  to  changes  in  trading  costs.  Thus  the  higher  the  number  of  participating 
investors is, the more shares are issued for a given signal precision. 
The  resulting  equilibrium  share  price  and  individual  demand  of  investors  are  as 
follows: 
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The equilibrium price at the IPO does n ot depend on the risk premium of investors 
since the firm adjusts the size of the share issue to it. The IPO price increases monotonically 
with the precision of the signal  because it depends only on trading costs.  Thus, the more 
precise  public  information  in  the  future  leads  always  to  higher  share  prices,  but  not 
necessarily to higher number of issued shares in equilibrium. 
The precision of information has two opposite effects on the demand of investors. On 
the one hand, it decreases the spread and thereby investors’ trading cost as well as their 
horizon risk. On the other hand, it increases their signal risk. For small precisions, the signal 
risk is small and an increase in the precision of information also increases the optimal demand 
of investors. In this case, investors benefit from a better liquidity. If, however, the precision is 
high, changes in the signal risk have a higher impact on the equilibrium demand than the 




The expected utility of investors is concave in the precision, p, in equilibrium. If the signal 
risk faced by investors is large enough,  * ]
~
[W EU  decreases for high levels of p.  
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11 There is a signal   1 , 5 . 0
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*
D p p   .   16 
 
Similarly to the optimal demand, the precision of the signal has opposite impacts on 
the equilibrium expected utility. Whether the utility of investors increases in p depends on 
how important the signal risk is. When p is small, the signal risk is small but trading costs are 
high. This keeps not only the expected wealth of investors small, but lowers also their utility 
through  a  high  horizon  risk.  An  increasing  precision  lowers  trading  costs  and  thus  the 
liquidity risk, but increases the signal risk. Investors’ utility is maximized for the level of p at 
which these two effects exactly offset. High levels of precision tend to make investors worse 
off  despite  the  better  liquidity  on  the  exchange  resulting  in  less  adverse  selection  and  a 
smaller horizon risk, because they exacerbate the uncertainty about the payoff in the case of a 
liquidity shock. Since all investors have the same preferences and beliefs, more precise public 
information  increases  investor  welfare  up  to  a  certain  precision  level.  Very  informative 
information can be undesirable for investors. 
The fact that more public information does not necessarily increase the ex ante welfare 
of investors has been stated in several papers in the accounting literature. Hakansson et al. 
(1982) determine under which conditions information is welfare improving. Diamond (1985) 
shows that the ex ante utility of investors is concave in the precision. His argument is related 
to information production. A firm optimally releases public information with a high enough 
precision for investors not to engage in costly information production. This saves information 
costs and improves risk sharing by making beliefs more homogenous. However Alles and 
Lundholm (1993) show that this result is strongly linked to the assumption that private signals 
are independent. While many papers in the mentioned literature conclude that investors must 
either differ in preferences or have heterogeneous beliefs for information to have social value,  
my model assumes investors with identical utilities and homogenous beliefs and yet their 
utility is concave in the precision. This is because the precision of public information affects 
the trading conditions on the market and thereby not only the trading costs borne by investors 
but also their risk.
12 
Not only does the individual utility of investors depend on the trading conditi ons on 
the exchange, it depends also on the number of investors on the market. The more investors 
enter the exchange, the smaller is the probability of informed trading leading to a smaller 
expected spread on the secondary market and hence also to a smaller liquidity risk. Thus there 
                                                 
12 See Hakansson et al. (1993) for a discussion about the necessity of heterogeneous preferences and beliefs for 
the social value of information.   17 
is  a positive externality due to  the participation of investors, since an additional investor 
contributes to reduce the trading cost and to increase the expected utility of all investors.  
This participation externality is also driving the results in Dow (2004) who shows that 
if investors differ in risk aversion, multiple equilibria with different investor participations 
and levels of liquidity are possible: the more investors enter, the smaller is the spread. Pagano 
(1989) highlights another participation externality on liquidity: the more investors enter the 
market, the less the security prices are sensitive to individual endowment shocks. 
 
Entry decision of investors. Investors participate in the IPO if their expected utility 
from  entering  the  exchange  exceeds  their  opportunity  costs:  Oc W EU  ]*
~
[ .  Since  their 
individual utility can be concave in the signal precision, p, investors do not necessarily enter 
on  a  very  transparent  market.  More  generally  the  following  holds  for  a  given  level  of 
opportunity costs (Oc). 
 
Lemma 2 
Assume that all investors incur the same opportunity costs. 
(i)  If  the  expected  utility  of  investors  is  increasing  in  p,  all  investors  enter  the 
exchange up from a level of p which equalizes their utility to costs. 
(ii)  If the expected utility is decreasing in p, investors enter the exchange up until the 
level p which equalizes their utility to costs.  
(iii)  If the expected utility is maximized for a    1 , 5 . 0 ˆ p , there are two threshold levels 
for the signal precision,  1 T p  and  2 T p , with 2 1 T T p p   and  2 1 ˆ T T p p p   , such that 
investors enter if and only if    2 1, T T p p p . 
 
Investors incur two different utility losses related to information precision. A small 
precision leads to high trading costs and a small utility. A high precision leads to a high signal 
risk and possibly also to a small utility. Thus, investors may never enter an opaque as well as 
a very transparent exchange if they bear opportunity costs. 
The concavity in the utility function of investors and the resulting entry behavior is 
only  due  to  the  signal  risk.  This  risk  occurs  because  all  investors  hold  their  portfolio 
unchanged until the signal has been revealed. This kind of risk may seem irrelevant on a 
financial market on which trading is continuous because investors can always take position 
before  information  is  released.  However,  the  stock  market  is  also  used  for  long  term 
investments and investors can have different investment horizons. This model considers only 
investors with a long horizon (implicitly their objective is to wait until the end of the game),   18 
but  who  can  be  hit  by  an  exogenous  liquidity  shock  and  thus  be  forced  to  sell  after 
information was released.  
Since  investors  bear  different  opportunity  costs,  they  do  not  necessarily  enter  the 
exchange all together: if investors with low opportunity costs enter it is not necessarily worthy 
for investors with high opportunity costs to enter the exchange. The entry decision of both 
investor types depends on the effect of the level of listing requirements on their utility. 
 
Proposition 2 
Assume that the expected utility  * ]
~
[W EU  is maximized for    1 , 5 . 0 ˆ p . Two outcomes are 
possible: 
(i)  The number of high cost investors is high leading to an important participation 
externality and all investors enter the market as long as the precision is between 
two thresholds:   
   2 1, T T p p p  with
    2 1 ˆ T T p p p . 
(ii)  The  number  of  high  cost  investors  is  small  leading  to  a  small  participation 

















T p p 2 2  ), only low cost investors enter. 
For intermediate levels of listing requirements all investors enter the exchange.  
 
Because investors differ in opportunity costs, multiple equilibria are possible. With a 
low level of listing requirements, investors with high opportunity costs can be deterred from 
entering the market leading to a set of equilibria with small investor participation and a small 
liquidity.  The  higher  the  level  of  listing  requirements  is,  the  smaller  is  the  spread  which 
increases the expected utility of all investors (provided that their signal risk is small) and 
attracts, up from a particular level, investors with high opportunity costs on the exchange. 
Thus, a higher level of listing requirements leads to a set of equilibria with high investor 
participation and a good liquidity. In this case, the spread is small not only because the listing 
requirement  reduces  information  asymmetry,  but  also  because  the  high  number  of 
participating uninformed investors reduces the probability of informed trading. However, as 
soon as a higher precision decreases the individual utility of investors, investor participation 
becomes smaller since high cost investors do not enter the exchange for levels of p up from 
the threshold
h
T p 2. In this case, more precise public information has an ambi guous effect on 
the liquidity. On the one hand, the market maker can assess more accurately the expected 
payoff of the security which reduces the spread. On the other hand, the number of uninformed 
investors becomes smaller which increases informed trading  and thus also the spread. If the 
number of high co st uninformed  investors  is high,  very precise public information  may 
deteriorate liquidity because only a small number if uninformed investors enter the exchange.    19 
The  threshold  level  of  p,  at  which  high  cost  investors  enter,  is  smaller  with  the 
participation externality, than it would be without. Whether such an externality leads to a 
single set of equilibria depends on its magnitude, which in turn depends on the number of 
high cost investors in the economy ( h N ). If their number is high, the effect of their entry on 
their utility is so high that it is always worthy for them to enter. In this case, there is a unique 
set of equilibria in which all uninformed investors enter. Otherwise, multiple sets of equilibria 
exist.  
 
4. Optimal organization of the exchange 
Trading fee.  The exchange sets the trading fee to maximize its income from trading 
and listing. The trading fee has opposite effects on the exchange’s profit. It increases the 
income per traded share but reduces the number of shares issued and therefore the volume. 
Since a higher trading fee reduces the utility of investors, it can also lead to a small market 
participation reducing further the volume. The market capitalization of the firm decreases also 
the higher the trading fee is, because the price investors are willing to pay diminishes in 
addition to the smaller number of issued shares. 
The volume the exchange expects depends not only on the number of shares, but also 
on  the  probability  with  which  uninformed  investors  trade.  If  the  firm  is  bad,  informed 
investors always mimic uninformed ones and volume always occurs. If, however, the firm is a 
good one, informed investors never trade and the volume depends on the probability with 
which uninformed investors are hit by a liquidity shock, t. In the third stage, the probability of 
trading is:   ) 1 ( 5 . 0 t  . The optimal trading fee is determined by the following maximization 
problem: 
 
) ( ) 1 ( 5 . 0 ) (
* * * p C P K c K t c Max IPO c                (12) 
 
The first term represents the income from trading, the second term represents the income from 
the listing fee and the last term is the regulatory cost (which does not depend on the trading 
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The trading fee set in equilibrium increases the higher the precision of the signal is as 
long as a higher p entails market participation. A higher precision leads to a smaller spread 
due  to  less  informed  trading  and  possibly  more  market  participation.  The  smaller  spread 
reduces the trading costs and the horizon risk of investors. Both effects translate into a smaller 
cost of capital for the firm, which issues more shares. This in turn increases the volume as 
well as the income from listing. In equilibrium, the exchange exploits this mechanism to 
increase its trading fee. If all investors are on the market, the increase in the trading fee with 
the precision is weaker than in the case in which only low cost investors enter.  This is 
because the higher number of uninformed investors reduces the sensitivity of the spread to 
changes in p. In the specific case in which high cost investors do not enter for high levels of p, 
increasing p has an ambiguous effect on the spread and therefore also on the trading fee. 
Although the trading fee increases almost always in p, the total trading costs decrease with a 
more precise the signal.
13 The exchange never increases the optimal trading fee to offset 
completely the smaller spread. 
The optimal trading fee decreases the higher the probability of a liquidity shock, t, is. 
The more likely investors are to sell their holding on the secondary market, the smaller is the 
probability of informed trading and thus the spread, but  the more the utility of investors is 
sensitive to trading costs and the higher is their signal risk. These effects can reduce the 
number of issued shares and thereby the volume and the income from listing. To reduce the 
negative effects of a higher t, the exchange diminishes its trading fee. 
Since a higher trading fee reduces the income from listing,  a monopoly  exchange 
offering both services,  listing and trading,  sets a smaller trading fee than a monopolist 
exchange which organizes only trading.
14 The utility of investors increases the  smaller the 
trading fee is because the trading cost and the horizon risk diminish. Thus, although with a 
listing fee, the surplus of firms is zero, investors are better off than if the exchange does not 
charge a listing fee because the trading fee is smaller. The smaller trading fee can also lead to 
a higher market capitalization and a higher volume. An monopoly exchange with income 
from listing as well as trading is larger with respect to both, volume and market capitalization, 
than an exchange with income only from trading. 
 
                                                 


































14 The trading fee without income from listing is:      t S t V E c
u u N N 2 2
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Listing requirements. Once the trading fee is chosen, the exchange sets the level of 
listing requirements to maximize its profit. At this stage, its profit depends on the spread, on 
the number of uninformed investors on the exchange, and on the risk premium required by 
investors. These three elements  affect  the utility  of investors  and determine therefore the 
volume and the market capitalization. The exchange maximizes its profit to determine the 
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An increase in p has two positive effects on the profit through the spread and the 
number of investors, and two negative effects through the signal risk and the regulatory costs. 
A higher precision reduces the spread and thereby the trading costs as well as the horizon risk. 
This increases the profit of the exchange.  A higher precision can also lead to higher market 
participation (see proposition 2). More investor participation increases the number of issued 
shares which in turn leads to a higher listing fee and volume. However, the more investors 
enter the exchange, the less sensitive is the spread to changes in p which reduces the gain of 
an increase in p for the exchange. Finally, a higher precision increases the signal risk which 
reduces the profit of the exchange. The last effect makes the income of the exchange concave 
in p, similarly to the utility of investors.  
The  equilibrium  level  of  listing  requirements  depends  on  several  parameters.  The 
higher  the  number  of  uninformed  investors  on  the  market  is,  the  higher  is  the  optimal 
precision (assuming that a marginal increase in p is not the source of the higher number of 
uninformed  investors).  High  market  participation  not  only  increases  the  volume  and  the 
market capitalization directly, but it also contributes to reduce the spread and leads thus to 
smaller trading costs and to a smaller risk premium. This lowers the negative effect of a 
higher precision on the utility of investors through the signal risk, and induces therefore the 
exchange to set a high precision in equilibrium. Thus, if the exchange attracts only low cost 
investors on the market, the level of listing is always smaller than if all uninformed investors 
enter the exchange in equilibrium. The exchange never implements an equilibrium with a high 
transparency and small investor participation.  
The fundamental risk of the firm which increases with the difference in productivities, 
 
l h x x  , and the risk of the undertaken project,  , reduce the importance of changes in the 
precision on the trading costs and the horizon risk. Therefore, the more risky the firm is, the   22 
lower is the equilibrium precision. However, while the risk of the project only affects the 
fundamental  risk,  a  higher  difference  in  productivities  also  increases  the  spread.  Thus 
diverging  average  productivities  lead  to  higher  trading  costs  and  reduce  further  the 
equilibrium level of listing requirements. The effect of the economic risk is smaller the more 
likely a liquidity shock is. In this case, however, investors’ utility becomes more sensitive to 
changes  in  the  spread  which  amplifies  the  effect  of  diverging  productivities.  Thus,  an 
exchange is particularly likely to set a low level of listing requirements if the qualities of the 
listed firms are highly different 
Given an optimal level of listing requirements set by the exchange, the expected utility 
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Since the volume and the market capitalization depend on the number of issued shares 
which are determined by the trading costs and the risk premium required by investors, the 
factors  affecting  the  profit  of  the  exchange  are  the  same  as  those  affecting  the  utility  of 
investors. Listing requirements are considered as a device to improve investor protection. 
Thus, they should increase the utility investors obtain from entering the stock market. To 
compare the equilibrium level of listing requirements set by a profit maximizing exchange 
with the one maximizing investor welfare, define the sum of investors’ utilities as the investor 
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The  utility  of  investors  is  concave  in  p.  According  to  proposition  1,  the  utility  can  also 
decrease for high levels of p. Therefore, investor welfare is also concave and can also be 
decreasing  in  p.  If  the  aggregated  utility  is  increasing  in  p  for    1 , 5 . 0  p ,  the  optimal 
precision from the point of view of investors is perfectly informative: p=1. However, the 
higher the precision is, the smaller is the utility gain of investors. If the aggregated utility of 
investors decreases for high precision, the level of p maximizing investor welfare is  p ˆ such   23 
that  0    p Iw . If the information risk is an important component of the utility function, 
investors are best off with a noisy signal ( 1 ˆ  p ). 
 
Proposition 3 
Assume that the income of the exchange and the individual utility of investors are maximized 
at  p ˆ , and that all investors incur the same opportunity costs: 
(i)  Without  regulatory  costs,  the  exchange  sets  the  level  of  listing  requirements 
maximizing investors’ welfare in equilibrium. 
(ii)  If  there  are  regulatory  costs,  the  exchange  under-regulates  and  sets  a  smaller 
precision than the one maximizing investor welfare in equilibrium. 
 
Although the exchange’s income is more sensitive to changes in p than the utility of 
investors,  both  are  maximized  at  the  same  precision.  Thus,  because  the  activity  on  the 
exchange  and  consequently  its  income  are  determined  by  the  preferences  of  investors,  a 
monopolist  exchange  always  sets  the  level  of  listing  requirements  maximizing  investor 
welfare if this is costless. If, however, the regulatory activity is costly and the exchange bears 
the costs, the exchange sets always a too low level of listing requirements from the point of 
view of investors. Under-regulation is uniquely due to the existence of costs, but the extent of 
under-regulation is also determined by the sensitivity of the exchange’s income with respect 
to changes in p. For a given cost function, the more sensitive the exchange’s income is to 
changes in the precision, the higher is the optimal level of listing requirements and the less the 
exchange under-regulates.  
If the individual utility of investors and the income of the exchange are increasing in p, 
the exchange sets always the highest level of listing requirements if regulatory costs are small, 
in which case, the solution is also socially optimal. With high regulatory costs, the exchange 
under-regulates.  If  both  functions  are  decreasing,  the  exchange  sets  the  smallest  level  of 
listing requirements regardless of the cost function. This is also the socially optimal solution.  
The result in proposition 3 is consistent with Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006) and 
Huddart  et  al.  (1999)  in  the  sense  that  the  exchange  tends  to  set  a  high  level  of  listing 
requirements to maximize its profit. In both mentioned papers, the authors demonstrate that an 
exchange which is a monopoly as well in listings as in trading sets high listing requirements, 
although  the  mechanisms  through  which  this  result  is  obtained  are  quite  different. 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006) only consider the listing decisions of firms and conclude 
that an exchange has the incentive to set a high level of listing requirements to keep a good 
reputation. Huddart et al. (1999) argue that liquidity volume tends to gather on the more 
transparent market on which there is a smaller risk of adverse selection. However, in these   24 
two  papers  the  monopoly  exchange  always  set  the  highest  possible  level  of  listing 
requirements.  Proposition  3  nuances  this  result  since  investor  welfare  is  not  necessarily 
increasing  in  the  precision  of  information  which  affects  the  expected  trading  volume  in 
equilibrium. The exchange does not necessarily maximize its profit with the highest level of 
precision even without regulatory costs. Thus the signal risk stemming from the commitment 
of  the  listed  firm  to  disclose  information  affects  the  optimal  decisions  of  the  exchange 
indirectly through the demand of investors and can in particular preclude the corner solution 




Equilibria  in  which  all  uninformed  investors  participate  lead  always  to  a  higher  investor 
welfare and dominate therefore equilibira in which only low cost investors enter. If investors 
differ in opportunity costs, the level of listing requirements maximizing investor welfare is 
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A higher number of uninformed investors improves always liquidity. Regardless of the 
level of listing requirements, the market maker sets a smaller spread in the case all investors 
enter  the  exchange.  This  reduces  not  only  the  total  trading  costs  but  diminishes  also  the 
liquidity risk. The equilibrium with the highest market participation has also the highest level 
of listing requirements. Since investors do not bear costs associated with the production of the 
public  information,  this  equilibrium  always maximizes  the  aggregated  expected  utility  of 
investors. 
The income of the exchange is affected by the same effects and increases therefore the 
higher the number of participating investors is. However, the exchange also bears regulatory 
costs which increase with the precision. Since the equilibrium in which investor participation 
is the highest is also the one with the highest precision, it is only optimal for the exchange if 
the difference in costs is small relative to the difference in income. The difference in income 
increases the higher the expected quality of the firm is since this amplifies the difference in 
the expected spread. The effect of the risk of the firm’s economic activity and the signal risk 
on the difference in income is ambiguous. A higher difference in average qualities, increases 
not  only  the  fundamental  risk  and  the  signal  risk,  but  makes  the  expected  spread  more 
sensitive to changes in the number of participating investors. The more risky the economic 
activity of the firm is and the higher uncertainty on the quality of firms is, the less likely it is 
that the exchange implements the equilibrium with a high investor participation.     25 
 
Proposition 4 
If investors differ in opportunity costs and multiple equilibria exist, two outcomes are possible 
in equilibrium: 
(i)  The exchange implements the equilibrium with a high investor participation. If 
there are regulatory costs, it under-regulates. 
(ii)  The exchange implements the equilibrium with a small investor participation. In 
this case the exchange always under-regulates. 
 
If investors differ in opportunity costs, the level of listing requirements determines the 
number of investors entering the exchange. In this case the exchange may set a too low level 
of listing requirements if its cost function is steep. But this may occur for two reasons: either 
the equilibrium with a high investor participation is implemented but costs are such that the 
level  of  listing  requirements  maximizing  the  exchange’s  profit  is  smaller  than  the  one 
maximizing  welfare.  However,  even  with  a  nearly  flat  cost  function  the  exchange  may 
optimally  implement  the  equilibrium  with  a  small  investor  participation,  in  which  case 
welfare is never optimized since all high cost investors do not enter the exchange and fall 
back on their alternative investment opportunity. Thus, if the income of the exchange is not 
sensitive enough to changes in the level of the precision, the exchange always sets a too small 
level of listing requirements regardless of the shape of the cost function. 
  When the level of listing requirements influences investor participation, the exchange 
is  even  more  incited  to  under-regulate  and  this  incentive  is  not  necessarily  linked  to  the 
steepness of its cost function. Indeed, the exchange only implements the equilibrium in which 
many investors enter if the obtained difference in liquidity allows the exchange a high enough 
increase in its income through higher trading and listing fees. Thus, if liquidity is not sensitive 
enough to changes in the number of investors, or if a high risk of the economic activity of the 
firm reduces the importance of changes in the spread in the utility of investors, the exchange 
always  under-regulates  from  the  point  of  view  of  investors.  The  existence  of  multiple 
equilibria  related  to  the  level  of  listing  requirements  complements  further  the  results  in 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006) and Huddart et al. (1999) since it may be optimal for the 
exchange to exclude investors by setting a small level of listing requirements if liquidity is not 
responsive enough to changes in the precision and participation. 
 
5. Separation of listing and trading 
In the previous sections, the exchange is a monopolist in listing and trading. Results 
have shown that although investors can benefit from higher listing requirements through a   26 
smaller  spread,  the  increase  in  their  utility  is  small  because  the  exchange  is  induced  to 
increase its trading fee with p. Also, the exchange under-regulates if there are regulatory costs 
and if its income does not increase enough with p.  
While listings are often done on home exchanges (foreign listings concern a rather 
small group of firms in the world), there are many alternative trading venues that appear and 
which compete for trading volume with “traditional” exchanges. If a trading platform emerges 
and offers to trade the securities of listed firms at a lower trading fee, it benefits from the 
certification role played by listing requirements without bearing the regulatory costs. Thus, 
listing requirements become a public good. As the exchange risks losing its volume on the 
secondary market, it may be induced to lower the level of listing requirements. Indeed, the 
exchange  does  not  internalize  the  whole  benefits  related  to  them  but  bears  the  complete 
regulatory costs. 
To analyze how this development influences the decisions of an exchange regulating 
listings as well as the welfare of investors, an extreme case is considered in which the listing 
function is separated from the trading function. An exchange is monopolist in listings (further 
on “the exchange”) whereas other trading venues have the complete trading volume (further 
on  “trading  platforms”).  Several  authors  claim  that  the  stock  market  industry  should 
specialize  on  offering  a  cheap  and  liquid  trading  venue  and  leave  the  regulatory  activity 
concerning  listings  to  other  institutions.  Self  regulating  exchanges  seem  not  to  be  in  the 
majority and listings are at least partially regulated by other institutions (Macey and O’Hara 
2005). The setting considered here corresponds to a situation in which listings are regulated 
by a profit maximizing entity which is a monopoly in this activity. It is called “exchange” for 
continuity with the previous sections, but corresponds to the concept of “listing agency” in 
Steil (2002). 
As in the previous sections, the determinants of the exchange’s profit as well as the 
investors’ welfare are analyzed and optimal listing requirements compared. As described in 
the monopoly case, the trading fee has an impact on the market value of the listed firm and 
thus  on  the  income  from  listing  and  eventually  the  decision  upon  the  level  of  listing 
requirements. The interdependence between trading fee and optimal precision remains in the 
case  of  separation  of  trading  from  listing,  since  the  market  value  of  the  firm  which 
corresponds to the listing fee is also determined by the trading fee prevailing on the trading 
venues  used by investors.  The industrial organization of trading influences  the prevailing 
trading fees: these are independent from the level of information precision set by the listing 
exchange and small in case of strong competition, whereas they are likely to be high in the   27 
absence of competition. Thus, the industrial organization of the trading industry influences the 
decision of the exchange upon listing requirements. To assess how different organizations of 
the  trading  industry  affect  investor  welfare  and  possible  under-regulation,  two  cases  are 
considered: the coexistence of a monopolist exchange which lists firms and a monopolist 
trading platform, and the coexistence of a monopolist in listing and a competitive trading 
industry. 
 
Two monopolists. The trading platform sets the trading fee to maximize its income 
from trading. The trading venue does not bear costs since it does not regulate listings. In this 
case, the optimal trading fee depends on the precision set by the exchange. As in the previous 
sections, the trading platform increases its fee the higher the level of listing requirements is to 
exploit the smaller spread. In equilibrium, the platform charges a higher trading fee than the 
one set by the single exchange in section 4, because the platform does not internalize the 
negative effect of the trading fee on the market capitalization and thus on the listing fee. The 
equilibrium trading fee is given in footnote 16 (see section 4). 
The exchange sets the precision, p, to maximize its profit from listing. It takes into 
account the trading fee set by the trading platform. The profit of the exchange is smaller than 
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The income from listing is lowered and less sensitive to changes in p. Therefore, the optimal 
level of listing requirements is smaller than it was in the case of a single exchange. The 
trading platform benefits from the listing requirements set by the listing exchange since they 
affect the spread. Therefore, the trading fee is a function of the level of listing requirements 
satisfied by the listed firm. The higher the level of listing requirements is, the higher is the 
number  of  issued  shares  and  the  higher  is  the  optimal  trading  fee  of  the  platform. The 
platform  would  like  the  listing  exchange  to  set  a  high  precision.  However,  because  the 
exchange does not internalize the profit of the trading platform and is disadvantaged due to 
the high trading fee, it does not set a high level of listing requirements in equilibrium. Since 
the negative impact of the higher trading fee on the listing fee is not taken into account by the   28 
trading platform, the trading fee is higher and the listing requirement smaller compared to the 
case of a single exchange.  
 
Proposition 5 
If there are two coexisting monopolies, one in trading and one in listing: 
(i)  Investor welfare is smaller than in the case of a single exchange offering both services 
simultaneously. 
(ii)  Compared to the new optimal level of listing requirements of investors, the listing 
exchange only under-regulates if there are regulatory costs. 
 
 
Investors are worse off when two monopolies, one in trading and one in listing, coexist 
because the trading costs are higher. The exchange’s income depends on the size of the issue 
which is determined by the preferences of investors. Therefore the exchange never sets the 
precision at a level at which the higher signal risk over-compensates the gain from a better 
market liquidity. The income of a single exchange offering listing as well as trading is more 
sensitive to changes in the precision than the income of an exchange which lists only firms. 
Therefore, even with equal trading fees, the level of listing requirements is always smaller in 
the case of separation than in the case of a single exchange. This is the first reason for the 
smaller utility. The second reason is the higher trading fee set by the trading platform which 
increases not only the costs of investors if they trade, but contributes to reduce further the 
listing requirements set by the exchange. 
The individual utility of investors changes compared to the case of a single exchange. 
For any level of p, the higher level of trading costs decreases the sensitivity of the utility to 
changes in the spread. Since a higher precision has a positive effect on the utility through a 
smaller spread, but a negative effect due to the higher signal risk, the precision maximizing 
investor welfare is smaller than in the case of a single exchange. Changes in the industry of 
listing and trading affect the optimal level of listing requirements from the point of view of 
investors, because these changes affect the trading fee which in turn determines the listing 
requirements set by the exchange. If the exchange bears regulatory costs, it under-regulates. 
Under-regulation is more severe (for a given number of investors in the exchange) than in the 
case of a single exchange because the income from listing is less sensitive to changes in the 
precision. This is not only because the exchange forgoes the profit from trading, but also 
because the trading platform does not internalize the negative effect of the trading fee on the 
profit of the exchange. As a result, in the case of a single exchange which is a monopolist in 
listing as well as in trading, investors are better off and under –regulation is less severe than in   29 
the case there is separation of listing and trading, but two monopolies control each activity 
respectively.  
    
Monopoly in listing and competition in trading. The lower investor welfare and the 
more  severe  under-regulation  in  the  case  of  two  coexisting  monopolies  were  due  to  the 
interdependence between the trading fee and the listing requirements. This interdependence 
also contributes to lower investor welfare in the case of one single exchange. One way to 
improve  social  welfare  and  to  mitigate  the  under-regulation  problem,  is  to  increase  the 
sensitivity of the utility of investors and of the profit of the exchange, to the liquidity effects 
induced by listing requirements. This is possible if the trading fee is decoupled from the 
listing requirements and if it is small, which is the case if the trading industry is competitive. 
In the absence of costs related to the functioning of trading venues (implicitly assumed here), 
the trading fee is zero. 
A zero trading fee increases the amount of issued shares and the market capitalization 
of the listed firms. This increase the income the exchange obtains from listing. Since there is 
no income related to trading, the free riding problem does not exist anymore. The exchange 
sets the listing requirements to maximize its profit from listing, which is the only possible 
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The profit of the exchange is smaller than the profit in the case of a single exchange 
(see equation 14). The higher income from listings does not offset the absence of income from 
trading. Moving from an industry in which a monopolist exchange lists firms and trades the 
shares to an industry in which both functions are separated and in which the trading industry 
is competitive reduces the profit of the exchange. However, the exchange’s income is four 
times higher than if trading is also operated by a monopoly because the trading fee is smaller. 
Consequently, the precision set by the exchange in equilibrium is smaller than if it is a single 
exchange but higher than if there is a monopolist trading venue. 
 
Proposition 6 
If there is a monopoly in listing but a competitive trading industry   30 
(i)  Investor welfare is higher than in the case of two monopolies and than in the case of a 
single exchange listing firms and trading shares. 
(ii) Under-regulation still exists if the exchange bears regulatory costs 
 
Investors benefit not only from a small (or zero) trading fee, they also benefit more 
from  increases  in  the  spread.  Since  the  exchange  sets  a  higher  precision,  the  utility  of 
investors increases. The absence of a trading fee which leads to the higher sensitivity to the 
positive liquidity effects of listing requirements, increases the utility above its levels (for any 
p) in the case of a single exchange. While the exchange loses income as soon as listing is 
separated from trading, investors gain form separation if the trading industry is competitive. 
Since investor welfare is the highest compared to the two previous cases, the optimal 
precision  from  the  point  of  view  of  investors  is  also  higher  than  in  all  cases  considered 
previously. If the exchange does not bear regulatory costs it sets the socially optimal level of 
listing requirements. If the exchange bears regulatory costs, under-regulation is more severe 
than  in  the  case  of  a  single  exchange  because  the  sensitivity  of  the  exchange’s  profit  to 
changes in the precision is smaller than if the exchange is a monopoly in trading and listing. 
However, under-regulation is less severe than in the case of coexistence of two monopolies. 
  To sum up, investor welfare is the highest when listing is separated from trading and 
the trading industry is competitive. It is the lowest if there is separation but two monopolies 
coexist, and intermediate if a single exchange lists firms and organizes trading. Consequently 
the socially optimal level of listing requirements is the highest when trading is competitive 
and  separated  from  listing.  However,  the  exchange  sets  the  highest  level  of  listing 
requirements when it is a single monopoly. The under-regulation problem is more severe 
when there is no income from trading in the economy. The number of uninformed investors 
can contribute to mitigate the under-regulation problem. The higher the number of investors 
on the exchange is, the higher is the sensitivity of the exchange’s income to changes in the 
precision. Thus, in the case all investors participate on the exchange, the under-regulation 
problem is  less severe in all cases,  than if only low cost  investors enter. The higher the 
number of investors is, the less sensitive the spread is to changes in p and the smaller is the 
socially optimal precision in all cases. Because investors require a smaller precision and the 
exchange is induced to set a higher precision, a higher number of investors mitigates the 
under-regulation problem.  
 
   31 
6. Conclusion 
I propose a model in which a stock exchange can improve its liquidity by tightening its listing 
requirements.  Because  these  reduce  information  asymmetry,  they  increase  the  utility  of 
investors and lead to a high investor participation on the exchange. However, the exchange 
never sets the highest possible level of listing requirements because investors also incur a risk 
due to more transparency. Their utility is concave in the level of listing requirements. This 
property determines the optimal decisions of an exchange as well as the social optimum. The 
level of listing requirements maximizing investor welfare depends on the sensitivity of the 
utility of investors to  changes in liquidity and varies with the organization of listing and 
trading.  A  monopolist  exchange  always  under-regulates  if  regulation  is  costly.  Under-
regulation is exacerbated if other trading venues free ride on the regulation and if the trading 
fee is determined by the level of listing requirements. While investors are better off if trading 
is separated from listing and is a competitive industry, an exchange has a higher profit when it 
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Lemma 2: Investors’ entry 
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Proposition 2: entry with different opportunity costs: 
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Proposition 3: private and social optimum for equal opportunity costs 
In equilibrium investors welfare is: 
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Proposition 4 
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      , the exchange implements the equilibrium 
in which all investors enter. See proposition 3. Otherwise, the exchange implements the 
equilibrium in which only low cost investors enter. Since the optimal listing requirement is 
always smaller than for the other equilibrium, it is always sub-optimal (see Lemma 3).   33 
 
Proposition 5 
With two coexisting monopolies, B (see proposition 3) is smaller than in the case of a single 
exchange. It follows that investor welfare is also smaller. 
Since only B changes, the under-regulation problem is as in proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 6 
4 ) 1 (
2  t .  Individual  utilities  are larger than in  the two other cases.  Therefore, investor 
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